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Abstract
In the attempt to reduce migration pressure, since 1995, the European
Union has been planning to establish a free trade area with developing coun-
tries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The process is still ongoing. Our
paper tests whether it is likely to be an effective policy. We estimate a gravi-
tational model of bilateral migrations on bilateral exports from the Mediter-
ranean Third Countries (South) to the European Union (North) over the
period 1970-2000, using different specifications. We find, in line with most of
the literature, a significantly positive correlation (called “complementarity”)
between exports and migrations from the South to the North. Then we go one
step further, trying to solve the potential endogeneity problem using average
trade tariffs and bilateral exchange rate volatility as instruments for trade.
Based on the OLS as well as the 2SLS results, liberalizing trade in the area of
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership does not seem to be an effective policy
to mitigate the migration flows, at least in the short run.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between international trade and migration has been long debated,
especially for its policy implications.
The use of trade policy to deal with the migration problem has been consid-
ered by both the European Union and the United States policy-makers. Their view
is that opening their markets to exports from countries in the South reduces the
pressure to migrate. In particular, Presidents Carlos Salinas and George H. W.
Bush argued that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would have
helped Mexico to export more goods and less people, while EU countries hope, more
or less explicitly, that migration flows from the South Mediterranean shore to the
North will decrease as a consequence of the beneficial impact of trade liberalisation
on employment and living standards in the sending countries (Garson, 1998). These
statements are based on the view that trade liberalization would have increased the
level of exports from the Southern countries increasing labour demand and wages in
the same countries, therefore decreasing migration from these countries.
Zimmermann (1995) suggests that stagnating and aging populations like those of
the European Union tend to attract migrants, while young and large populations,
like those of North Africa, tend to be more prone to move. In Figure 5 (in the
appendix) we plot the population trends in each of the European country that we
consider in our analysis. The population growth has been very low, on average 14%,
between 1970 and 2010. Since we use official data on migration and do not have
information on the illegal migrants, such numbers represent lower bounds. All the
Third Mediterranean Countries (TMCs) show larger increasing trends in population
6 (in the appendix). With a few exceptions, migration flows are also trending up-
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wards. 1
This evidence suggests that migrations to Europe will keep on being a major concern
in the next few decades. For this reason the EU has shown an increasing interest
in the Mediterranean region and has tried to create an interregional framework of
cooperation that could contribute to prevent the Mediterranean to be a conflicting
frontier. In 1995 the European Union signed the Barcelona Declaration that is the
founding act of a partnership between the European Union and twelve countries
in the Southern Mediterranean (now re-launched with the Union for the Mediter-
ranean) to help the economic development of the Third Mediterranean Countries,
especially through trade liberalization, in an attempt to reduce migratory flows
from such areas. This paper is going to test whether this policy is likely to be
effective in reducing migrations in the short-run. We use bilateral exports and mi-
gration flows from the 12 South Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and
Malta) to the 15 European Union ones (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Swe-
den, United Kingdom) that signed the Euro-Mediterranean partnership over the
period 1970-2000 (Figure 4 in the appendix). In our paper we refer to the EU coun-
tries as “North”, while to the others as “South”.
Quite surprisingly there are no studies that consider the relationship between trade
1The reasons for these exceptions (Algeria, Libya and Malta) are different. In 1973 the Algerian
government, after the large migration wave to France in previous decades, and thanks to its natural
resources (oil and gas), decided to prohibit out-migration, which was considered a form of post-
colonialism. For the next three decades migration was just driven by French family reunification
schemes (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010). Libya has recorded more immigration than emigration flows,
thanks, again, to its natural resources and the lack of internal labour supply, that attracted people
from Arab countries (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2011). Malta experienced a terrific emigration from
1945 to 1979 due to over-population and unemployment, while in the following decades became a
country of destination of migration flows (Plowman, 2010).
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and migration looking at all the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership,
which represents the EU’s first comprehensive policy for the region and one of its
most ambitious and innovative foreign policy initiatives.
Furthermore, the empirical studies on this topic, that we are going to mention later
in the literature review, disregard the potential reverse causality between trade and
migrations. We go further trying to identify the causal effect of trade on migration.
To this aim we use an instrumental variable approach exploiting information on fac-
tors that are likely to influence the relationship between Southern exporting firms
and Northern importing firms without directly influencing migration. These factors
are the trade tariffs in the destination countries and the exchange rate volatility
between pairs of exporting and importing countries.
As a first preliminary evidence of the relationship between trade and migration,
Figure 1 shows that over the 1970 to 2000 period the correlation between the log-
migration (over population) and log-export (over GDP) from the Southern Mediter-
ranean countries to the EU is undoubtedly positive. But in this figure we are not
controlling for several confounding factors, observable and unobservable ones, that
might bias the results towards finding a positive elasticity. For example, Southern
Mediterranean countries that are closer to Europe might, because of that, export
more and have more migrants. This means that it is certainly important to control
for the distance between countries to partial out the effect of trade on migration.
All the OLS results show an elasticity between trade and migration of around 40%.
When using average trade tariffs and bilateral exchange rate volatility as instru-
ments for trade the results of the instrumental variable are larger, but we cannot
reject the hypothesis that they are the same. Trade does not reduce migration, at
least in the short run. The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present
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the literature review, in section 3 the empirical strategy, while we show and discuss
the results in section 4. In section 5 we identify the causality using an instrumental
variable approach to cope with the potential endogeneity problem and to measure
the effect of trade on migration. Section 6 is devoted to some robustness checks.
Finally section 7 presents the conclusions and the policy implications.
2 Literature Review
Most of the research on trade and migration focuses on investigating the relationship
of complementarity or substitutability between trade and factor movements (capital
and labour). This relationship has been widely studied at a theoretical level, while
the empirical evidence is rather scarce.
Traditional theory suggests that both should be substitutes. Mundell (1957)
used the Heckscher-Ohlin model to demonstrate that trade and factor movement are
substitutes: countries can either export labour-intensive goods or have their labour
migrate to produce them in the destination country. Similarly, Layard (1992) claims
that the substantial migration pressure from the East and South can be reduced by
exporting capital, and liberalizing trade.
Modern trade theory and extensions of traditional models show that the relation-
ship can also be of complementarity. Several theoretical papers (Markusen, 1983,
Wong, 1983) perturb some of the assumptions underlying the Heckscher-Ohlin model
(e.g. different technologies or scale effects in production), and trade and migration
become complements. The idea is that with migration labour can move where it is
most productive and increase output and exports.
Lopez and Schiff (1998) demonstrates that complementarity is more likely the
higher the migration costs, the tighter the credit constraints of migrants, and the
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lower the skills and income of potential migrants. It means that opening markets
in the North is more likely to slow down migration from Eastern Europe to the EU
than from Africa to the EU, or from Latin America to the U.S. Furthermore, free
trade may worsen the skill composition of migration from Africa to the EU and from
Latin America to the U.S.
The empirical papers on this subject are quite recent and mainly based on studies
which consider trade and migration flows between a single country and the rest of
the world. Bruder (2004) focuses on “North to North” trade and labour migration
between Germany and some other European country. The findings indicate that
there is a relationship of substitution between trade and foreign labour force. In
particular they find that there isn’t a significant impact of labour migration on
trade, while there is a significantly negative effect of trade on labour migration.
Akkoyunlu and Siliverstovs (2009) investigate whether migration and trade are
complements or substitutes using 1963-2004 data on Turkish migration to Germany.
Cointegration analysis shows that migration and trade are complements for these
two countries. But many other countries signed the Mediterranean agreements. We
are going to use data on all of them.
Collins et al. (1997) try to use a more flexible approach to highlight for which
economies of the “Atlantic community” (plus Australia) between 1870 and 1940
factor mobility and international trade have been complements or substitutes. They
find that they were rarely substitutes and often complements.
Acevedo and Espenshade (1992) and Martin (1993) show that in the short-
to-medium period NAFTA is likely to increase migrations from Mexico to the
United States, but that narrowing the wide economic differentials between the two
countries could substantially reduce the migratory flow. Martin (1993) predicts
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how NAFTA’s 1994 trade liberalization influences short and long-term migration
patterns between Mexico and the US. His prediction were in part confirmed by
Del Rio and Thorwarth (2009), who look at more recent data for the US and Mexico.
In line with Lopez and Schiff (1998)’s theoretical predictions they find no evidence of
decreasing flows of illegal migrants between Mexico and the US when bilateral trade
increases (with the creation of NAFTA). Bettin and Lo Turco (2010) look at the
relationship between trade and migration in a North-South framework using OECD
countries. They use a specific measure of imports and exports: primary and final
goods and labour and capital intensive goods. They find that bilateral trade in dif-
ferentiated goods is positively affected by the stock of immigrants from the South in
developed countries; the effect is larger for exports than for imports. Girma and Yu
(2002) find that immigration in the United Kingdom from non-Commonwealth coun-
tries has a significant and positive impact on UK exports, while there is no effect
when they consider Commonwealth countries. As for UK imports, they find a re-
lationship of complementarity with UK immigration from the non-Commonwealth
countries, and a relationship of substitutability from the Commonwealth countries.
Faini and Venturini (2010) use a sample of Southern European countries that in-
cluded Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey and estimate two different effects of
GDP growth (for example due to an increase in exports) on the propensity to mi-
grate, that depends on the level of income of the potential sending countries. In
relatively poor sending countries, an increase in GDP has a positive impact on the
decision to migrate even after controlling for the income differential with the re-
ceiving country, because the financial constraint of the poorest become less binding.
Their results suggest that the pressure to migrate from Northern African countries
and other developing countries may increase with further growth. In the second sce-
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nario, when the sending country is relatively better off (they estimate $4,300 in 1985
prices as a threshold), an increase in income may decrease the migratory pressure.
Overall most studies on “South-North” migration and trade find these to be com-
plements. The problem of all these papers is that they look at simple correlations
and not at causal effects. As mentioned by Gen et al. (2011), just a few papers try
to tackle the problem of endogeneity, focussing on the effect of migration on trade,
rather than on the effect of trade on migration. Furthermore the identification strat-
egy of these papers is not very convincing, as they use the lags of migration as a
instrument for migration under the assumption that past migrant flows are based
on historical networks and ‘well-trodden paths’ rather than current economic con-
ditions. This instrument would not be valid if current trade depends also on past
migrations, violating the assumption of orthogonality between the instrument and
the error term. To the best of our knowledge there are no papers that try to identify
the causal effect of trade on migration. This is exactly the aim of our study.
3 The empirical strategy
3.1 The gravity model
In our paper we adopt the most popular model used to explain international migra-
tion patterns: the gravity model, first introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen
(1963) for bilateral trade2
The theory has been long recognized for its empirical success in explaining dif-
ferent types of flows in economics, such as migration, commuting, shopping trips,
2This model has been borrowed by physics, in particular by the Newton’s law of universal
gravitation, which states that the gravitational attraction exerted on an object by a body, decreases
with the squared distance between the objects attracted and is proportional to the masses of the
bodies.
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tourism, and trade. Furthermore the gravity model has a rather high explanatory
power, which makes it an attractive specification to test the marginal influence of
additional explanatory variables, such as language similarity, colonial ties, exchange
rates, contiguity and trade agreements (Gen et al., 2011). The amount of migra-
tion between two countries is likely to increase in the economic size of the countries
(measured by their GDP) and decreasing in the cost of transportation between them
(measured by geographical distance).
We use a log-linear gravity model of migrations and the empirical specification
is the following:
lnMijt = β0 + β1lnPGDPit + β2lnPGDPjt + β3lnPOPit + β4lnPOPjt + β5lnDij +
+β6lnEijt + β7lnEXRijt + β8Ci + β9Yt + αi + αj + γi ∗ Yt + γj ∗ Yt + εijt (1)
where the subscript i and j represent, respectively, each of the 12 Southern
and 15 Northern countries that signed the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, t are
the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, M measures migrations from the Southern
Mediterranean Countries, PGDP is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) converted
GDP, POP is the population, D is the bilateral geographic distance, E is the bi-
lateral export flow from Southern Mediterranean countries to 15-EU, EXR is the
bilateral exchange rate (importing country currency divided by exporting country
currency, normalized to be 1 in 1970), C is a dummy for ex-colony, Y is the year, α
are country fixed effects (FEs) of country of origin and/or destination that capture
all the unobserved, time-constant factors that affect migrations, γi*Yt and γj*Yt are
country (respectively of origin and of destination) specific trends. Finally, ε are the
idiosyncratic errors.
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We are interested in the coefficient of the trade exports variable E, that is β6.
If it is statistically significant and positive, it means that migration and export are
complements; while if it is statistically significant and negative, it means that they
are substitutes. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, with two different samples:
the full sample used in the OLS and the sample used in the IV strategy. The data
sources are reported in the appendix. Given that adding country and time fixed
effects may be quite data demanding, in Table 2 we show how much variability,
both unconditional and conditional (adding all the regressors that we will use in
the empirical estimation) is captured by combinations of such effects (1 minus the
R-squared measures how much variation is left in the data). Each entry in the
table represents a different linear regression. The first row, for example, shows
that a linear time trend captures 7% of the variation of our dependant variable,
log Migration. This number is only slightly lower than what is captured using year
effects (column 2). The same is true for log Export in the second row of the table,
especially when one conditions on all the other regressors. The only variable that
preserves more variation conditional on a linear trend than on year fixed effects is
one of our instruments, namely, the log Bilateral exchange rate volatility. In this
case, year fixed effects capture ten times more variability than the linear trend in
the unconditional setting and one time more variability in the conditional one (see
columns 1 and 2 of table 2). Thus, in order to preserve the strenght of our instrument
we are going to use linear trends when using the instruments and, for coherence,
also in the OLS specifications.3 Adding country fixed effects and their interaction
with a linear time trend captures a large degree of variation for all the variables.
Country FEs capture the countries unobserved heterogeneity. In other words they
3In the OLS all the results are preserved when using year fixed effects.
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reflect all factors of the sending or receiving country that influence the decision to
migrate but do not change over time, such as institutions, culture, and attitudes
toward immigration that vary considerably across countries, but very slowly within
countries over time (Ortega and Peri, 2012). Together with country specific trends
(in particular for the country of origin) they also capture the potential “multilateral
resistance” (see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) with respect to bilateral trade
flows and Ortega and Peri (2012, 2013) with respect to bilateral migration flows)
or, in other words, the influence that possible destinations exert on the decision
to migrate to a given destination. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013)
use the Common Correlated Effects estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006) to tackle
the issue of multilateral resistance to migration, but argue that, to be applied, it
requires a long panel and that, in case of a short panel, the methodology proposed
by Ortega and Peri (2012, 2013) might be used instead. Since we have a short panel
we are going to use their approach. Given the variability of our data, we can control
for “multilateral resistance” when using OLS, while when using the 2SLS strategy,
the country fixed effects weaken the IV too much. Yet, later we will show that there
is little evidence of multilateral resistance and that the OLS and IV estimates are
quite close to each other (indeed we cannot reject the two to be the same). Finally,
when using the interaction of the country of origin and country of destination fixed
effects (see column 7 of table 2) too little variability is left to be explained. To
solve the problem of heteroskedasticity due to intragroup correlations we cluster the
standard errors at the country of destination and origin level in all our estimates.
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4 Results
Table 3 shows our estimates of the gravitational equation using alternative specifica-
tions with and without fixed effects. Column 1 shows that controlling for distance,
origin and destination GDP, origin and destination population, a linear function of
year, the bilateral exchange rate (normalized to be 1 in 1970), and to be an ex-colony
of the destination country reduces the elasticity of migration with respect to trade
from almost 80 percent we had in Figure 1 to 44 percent. In column 2 we use time
fixed effects instead of the linear trend and, in line with what we found in table
2, the results are similar. Adding country of origin FE (column 3) or country of
destination FE (column 4) does not substantially alter the elasticity. Adding both
FEs (column 5) reduces the coefficient by a little bit. Including country specific
trends (column 6) the coefficient on the exports is very close to that of column 1.
Trade and migration appear to be complements (they move in same direction), but
the positive correlation may be driven by reverse causality or by an omitted variable
and we cannot infer any causal relationship.
As for the other regressors, the most important determinants of migration to
the EU countries are distance and the population of the country of origin (see
Karemera et al., 2000). The coefficient on distance is significant with the expected
negative sign, because it affects the cost of migration. The estimated elasticity is
close to -1. Population has always a positive sign for the country of origin and a
negative one for those of destination. Such negative sign is capturing that what
matters for migration decisions is GDP per capita and not total GDP. The coeffi-
cients on the two GDPs are significant in more than half of the specifications: with
a negative sign for the country of origin and a positive sign for the country of des-
tination. This is again in the direction that we expected, because people tend to
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migrate from poorer (South Mediterranean shore) to richer countries (EU), where
income opportunities are higher (see Mayda, 2010). The bilateral exchange rates
(normalized to 1970) are negative in all the specifications, but significant in 3 of
them. The reason might be that people decide to migrate to countries where the
exchange rate with their country of origin is low, because the remittance receipts
are larger and, in case of temporary migrations, they can accumulate savings (Yang,
2008). Time is significant (and negative) just for the baseline gravity equation.
Past colonial relationship positively affects the migration flows in all the specifica-
tions we use. South-North migration is positively correlated to South-North exports.
5 Causality
Fixed effect specifications may not be able to capture time varying unobserved het-
erogeneity, and thus be unable to identify the causal mechanism between trade and
migration. As we mentioned before the correlation between the two variables might
due to an omitted variable we do not control for or to reverse causality: migrations
may increase trade. To address the endogeneity problem we adopt a Two Stage
Least Square (2SLS) approach, that uses two different instruments for trade flows,
which are plausibly exogenous with respect to migration: average trade tariffs and
bilateral exchange rate volatility.
Trade tariffs are all levies collected on goods that are entering the country or services
delivered by nonresidents to residents. They include levies imposed for revenue or
protection purposes and determined on a specific or ad valorem basis as long as they
are restricted to imported goods or services. In other words these taxes increase the
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cost of imported goods, giving an advantage to the domestic producers. We first
collected data on tax revenues on customs and other import duties over GDP and
then data on total imports at country level for all the 15-EU countries. In this
way we calculate the percentage of taxation applied to imports for each country
(from now on we will refer to it as to tariff or trade tariff ). We are going to show
that tariffs predict trade flows, but are they also a valid instrument, meaning that
migration does not depend on tariff other than trough trade? The way tariffs are
measured in this paper make them not only depend on bilateral trade agreements
and international agreements but also on the cost of custom operations. The iden-
tification assumption of this paper is that such an aggregate measure of tariffs does
not depend on migratory flows. In other words, we assume that governments set
overall trade tariffs to influence trade and not migration flows. Suppose EU coun-
tries set bilateral tariffs to influence trade but also migration. In such case one
would like to use the part of tariffs that is set to influence overall trade and not
migration from a specific country as an instrument. A potential measure for such
part would be the tariffs versus all the non-Third Mediterranean countries. Unfor-
tunately data bilateral tariffs are not available back in time, but since we are using
an imports-weighted aggregate measure of tariffs, such aggregate is going to be very
similar to the measure that excludes these countries as long as imports from Third
Mediterranean Countries are small with respect to all the other imports. Indeed,
their exports to EU countries represent between 0.04 percent (Portugal) and 0.23
percent (Italy) of total imports to these countries. Table 4 shows the trade tariffs
of the EU countries in the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1997. We use 1997 because
it’s the first year going back from the 2000 with a complete and coherent measure-
ment for the countries we look at. Note that there is a decreasing trend for tariffs
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from 1970 to 1997 for all the EU countries. The most dramatic variation is from
1970 to 1980 (on average -72%). This is not surprising because during the oil and
financial crises of the 1970s protectionism was widespread in world trade. In Figure
2 we plot tariffs of European countries (the instrument) against their imports from
Third Mediterranean partners (the instrumented variable) after conditioning on all
the regressors used later in the main specification (Column 1 of Table 3). There is
clearly a negative correlation between the two variables. The coefficient in a simple
bivariate regression is equal to 0.48.
As a second instrumental variable we use the bilateral exchange rate volatility. There
is consistent evidence in the literature that exchange rate volatility negatively af-
fects bilateral trade (Byrne et al., 2008, Chowdhury, 1993, Dell’Ariccia, 1998, Pozo,
1992). The argument is that by increasing uncertainty and risk, if hedging is im-
possible or costly, risk-averse agents are discouraged to engage in trade, especially
since trade relations between exporting and importing firms are bound to persist
over time. Expectations of future volatility are based on past trends and for this
reason we consider a period of 10 years. We normalize the annual bilateral exchange
rates over a 10-year period to the exchange rate of the first year of each decennial
period (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and then calculate the variance. In figure 3 we plot
exports against exchange rate volatility after conditioning on all the other regres-
sors used later in the main specification (Column 1 of Table 3). There is a clear
negative correlation between the two variables. While there is no empirical evidence
that tariffs are set in order to control migration and that the second moment of
exchange rates determines migratory flows (for example none of the papers that
we are aware of control for the second moment of exchange rate when explaining
migratory flows), having two instruments allows us to perform an overidentification
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test. Even if nobody has ever made this point before, one might argue that immi-
grants might choose the country of destination taking the variability of the exchange
rate into consideration in order to smooth potential future remittances and that the
average trade tariffs are set taking bilateral migratory flows into account. If this
was the case, the fact that we cannot reject the overidentification test means that
the biases introduced by the two instruments would have to be the same, which is
arguably unlikely. The results from the first stage are shown in Table 5. Table 6
shows the results of the IV (2SLS) estimation using both the bilateral exchange rate
volatility and average trade tariffs as instruments. The first stage F-statistic is equal
to 19.251, which is above the rule of thumb value of 10 indicated by the literature
on weak instruments (Bound et al., 1995, Stock and Yogo, 2002). Then we use the
J-statistic to test the exogeneity and we find a p-value equal to 0.674.
Finally, we use the Hausman t statistic to compare OLS and 2SLS estimates of the
coefficient on exports finding no evidence of endogeneity (the p-value is equal to
0.43). The results that we find with the 2SLS are in line with those of the OLS.
In particular the coefficient of interest, that on exports, is significant and positive.
Note that in the IV there is no variation left after controlling for the FEs (see table
2), but adding those FEs change the OLS estimates very little, suggesting that the
bias is small and is likely to be small for the IV as well. Moreover, as already pointed
out, the estimate based on the IV specification is not statistically different from the
model that assumes that trade is exogenous to migration. To conclude, exports,
at least in the short run, do not seem to mitigate the migration pressure, but to
encourage it.
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6 Robustness checks
In this section we perform different robustness checks to be sure that our results
are not biased by the particular specification we used. First of all we run the
regressions using a Poisson estimator, as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006):
under heteroskedasticity, the parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS
lead to biased estimates of the true elasticities. We find a positive and significant
semi-elasticity of 1.297 on the coefficient export. As a second robustness check,
we introduce as a regressor in the OLS the sum of all exports from a given Third
Mediterranean Country i to all European Union countries excluding country j, al-
lowing for an indirect effect on migrations towards the European country j. We find
a higher coefficient compared to that of the baseline specification of the OLS, equal
to 0.526 on the variable export.
One could argue that since we are controlling for GDP of the country of origin, the
elasticity is bound to be positive. Migration flows might decrease when countries
export more and become richer, but controlling for country of origin GDP we are
shutting off such a channel. This is the reason why in the third robustness we sub-
tract exports from GDP. In this way an increase in export determines a one to one
increase in GDP. Doing so barely changes the results. An alternative way to com-
pletely get rid of GDP is not to control for country of origin GDP. The coefficient
on the variable export is the same as in the main specification.
Another objection could be related to the inclusion of Israel and Malta among the
Southern countries. Indeed their economic conditions are very similar to those of the
EU countries. For this reason we run the regressions without Malta and Israel and
we find very similar results. As shown in table 7 in all of these robustness checks we
find a positive and significant relationship between trade and migration. All these
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results are in line with those of the main analysis.
7 Conclusions
In 1995 European Union policymakers decided to establish a free trade area in the
region of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership hoping that such policy would in-
crease trade (in particular exports from the TMCs) and that, in turn, trade would
lead to a reduction in migration. The process is still ongoing. Policy makers as-
sumed that trade has a negative effect on migrations. In our paper we find, looking
at the period 1970-2000, that the effect is the opposite: exports increase migration.
Such a conclusion is reached not just looking at simple correlations between trade
and migration, but trying to solve the potential endogeneity problem using an in-
strumental variable approach. In particular we adopt a 2SLS approach that use
average trade tariffs and bilateral exchange rate volatility as instruments for trade
flows. We find that increasing trade is likely to increase the number of migrants from
Southern Mediterranean to the European Union. These results might be driven by
the creation of links between the countries involved in trade: migrants need these
links to enter the receiving country. For example Italy sets immigration quotas that
can only be filled by migrants with a job offer in Italy. We just conclude saying
that EU policymakers should not consider free trade as a valid policy to decrease
migrations from the Third Mediterranean countries to Europe, at least in the short
run. Due to data limitations it is impossible to analyze whether such patterns can
be reversed in the long-run, when Southern countries will have converged to the
economic development of Northern ones (see Faini and Venturini, 2010).
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Figure 1: Correlation between migration
(over population) and export (over GDP)
from the Southern Mediterranean Coun-
tries to the EU in 1970-2000.
−
3
−
1
1
3
Ex
po
rt 
(lo
g)
−2 −1 0 1 2
Tariffs (log)
Figure 2: EU countries average trade tar-
iffs and the exports (over GDP) arriving
from the Third Mediterranean countries
in the period 1970-2000 (residuals).
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Figure 3: Bilateral exchange rate volatil-
ity and exports from the Third Mediter-
ranean countries to EU countries (residu-
als)
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Full sample IV sample
Migration 27501.59 140609.5 29570.08 142912.4
Exports 214.67 475.45 275.729 531.819
Distance 2497.26 875.05 2493.36 877.09
GDP country of origin (CoO) 52555.22 87252.44 66717.62 96010.6
GDP country of destination (CoD) 322217.5 418843.7 397961 453535.2
Pop country of origin 16349.98 18605.23 17961.94 19930.52
Pop country of destination 22972.01 23882.38 22754.76 23468.92
Year 1985.19 11.17 1990.09 8.155
Colony 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.5
Bilateral Exchange Rates (normalized to 1970) 0.80 0.87 0.73 0.99
Sum of exports from each of the CoO 3478.66 4723.76 4494.23 5028.01
Trade Tariffs - - 0.08 0.09
Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility - - 0.22 0.13
Observations 590 590 446 446
Notes: Data on Migrations are expressed in thousands of migrants while data on Exports, GDP
and Population are expressed in US million dollars. Distance is in kilometers. Bilateral exchange
rate volatility is computed over a 10-year period. We two different samples: the full sample used
in the OLS and the sample used in the IV strategy.
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Table 2: Data variability
R-squared
Unconditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Migration 0.066 0.067 0.319 0.402 0.687 0.716 0.874 0.901
Log Export 0.241 0.300 0.329 0.699 0.793 0.822 0.855 0.885
Log Average Trade Tariffs 0.436 0.503 0.436 0.822 0.822 0.884 0.822 0.884
Log Bilateral Exchange rate volatility 0.019 0.212 0.281 0.088 0.357 0.552 0.435 0.626
Conditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Migration 0.583 0.593 0.684 0.636 0.728 0.758 0.880 0.907
Log Export 0.835 0.839 0.854 0.859 0.881 0.909 0.928 0.956
Log Average Trade Tariffs 0.728 0.748 0.732 0.852 0.858 0.930 0.860 0.930
Log Bilateral Exchange rate volatility 0.166 0.374 0.378 0.262 0.467 0.731 0.543 0.805
Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects (FE) No Yes No No No No No No
Country of or. (CoO) FE No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of de. (CoD) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CoO*year FE & CoD*year FE No No No No No Yes No Yes
CoO*CoD FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
CoO & CoD Time trends No No No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table shows how much variability, both unconditional and conditional (adding all the
regressors that we will use in the empirical estimation) is captured by the fixed effects or,
substracting the R-squared to 1, how much variation is left to be explained in the data. In
Column 1 we use the linear trend, while in Column 2 we use year fixed effects. In all the other
columns we use linear time trends and we add different fixed effects. In Column 3 we include
origin fixed effects, while in Column 4 we include country of destination fixed effects. In Column
5 we include both origin and destination fixed effect. In Column 6 we use both origin-year and
destination-year fixed effects. In Column 7 we use origin-destination fixed effect. Finally, Column
8 includes origin-destination, origin-year and destination-year fixed effects.
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Table 3: Estimates of a “South-North” gravity model of migrations on exports flows
Dependent variable: Log Migrations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exports 0.446*** 0.444*** 0.403*** 0.417*** 0.357*** 0.442***
(0.135) (0.139) (0.119) (0.139) (0.129) (0.153)
Log Distance -1.526*** -1.518*** -1.293*** -1.567*** -1.240*** -1.215***
(0.304) (0.304) (0.335) (0.332) (0.424) (0.414)
Log Bilateral Exchange Rates -0.154*** -0.131*** -0.0334 -0.126*** -0.0323 -0.104
(0.0373) (0.0407) (0.0403) (0.0369) (0.0398) (0.104)
Log GDP country of origin -0.388* -0.216 -1.279*** -0.174 -0.778** -0.810
(0.204) (0.217) (0.272) (0.227) (0.341) (0.585)
Log GDP country of destination 1.369*** 1.750*** 1.790*** -0.0520 0.661 0.838
(0.468) (0.497) (0.424) (0.554) (0.572) (0.955)
Log Pop country of origin 0.869*** 0.759*** 2.144*** 0.745*** 2.011*** 3.201
(0.162) (0.169) (0.728) (0.165) (0.767) (2.740)
Log Pop country of destination -0.688* -1.045*** -1.086*** -1.521 -2.486 -6.675*
(0.359) (0.387) (0.336) (2.370) (2.265) (3.683)
Year -0.0827*** -0.0454 0.0139 0.00936 -0.116
(0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0316) (0.0724)
Colony 0.410* 0.468* 3.510*** 0.475** 3.469*** 3.415***
(0.240) (0.241) (0.808) (0.234) (0.647) (0.649)
Constant 167.0*** 2.849 85.95 -0.891 0.322 272.5**
(57.96) (3.767) (55.48) (62.96) (61.65) (114.3)
Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects (FE) No Yes No No No No
Country of origin (CoO) FE No No Yes No Yes Yes
Country of destination (CoD) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
CoO and CoD FE No No No No Yes Yes
CoO*year FE & CoD*year FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 590 590 590 590 590 590
R-squared 0.605 0.611 0.687 0.650 0.727 0.760
Notes: We regress the bilateral migrations from the 12 Mediterranean Partner Countries to the
European Union Countries at 15 (South-North migration model) on their exports and on other
control variables using OLS estimation. We use six different specifications. Standards errors are
clustered at country of origin and country of destination. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis: *** Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Trade tariffs
EU Country 1970 1980 1990 1997 (=2000)
Austria 0.595 0.078 0.079 0.033
Belgium 0.178 0.052 0.041 0.037
Denmark 0.134 0.037 0.034 0.034
Finland 0.293 0.100 0.082 0.029
France 0.179 0.045 0.037 0.034
Germany 0.254 0.083 0.064 0.041
Greece 0.967 0.508 0.082 0.052
Ireland 0.136 0.047 0.045 0.037
Italy 0.400 0.034 0.048 0.034
Luxembourg 0.047 0.008 0.009 0.014
Netherlands 0.255 0.065 0.068 0.068
Portugal 1.388 0.306 0.191 0.038
United Kingdom 0.233 0.106 0.073 0.066
Spain 0.805 0.231 0.211 0.045
Sweden 0.362 0.060 0.091 0.036
Notes: We use 1997 because it is the first year going back from the 2000 with a complete and
coherent measurement
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Table 5: IV: Results of the first stage.
Dependent variable: Log Exports
Log Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility -0.309***
(0.0619)
Log Trade Tariffs -0.294***
(0.0768)
Log Distance -0.655***
(0.132)
Log Bilateral Exchange Rates -0.0970***
(0.0237)
Log GDP country of origin 0.729***
(0.106)
Log GDP country of destination 1.067***
(0.228)
Log Pop country of origin -0.188**
(0.0840)
Log Pop country of destination 0.0105
(0.225)
Year -0.0830***
(0.0116)
Colony 0.0893
(0.102)
Constant 154.1***
(22.42)
Observations 446
R-squared 0.801
Notes: First stage results using the instrumented variable Exports as dependent variable and the
instruments Average Trade Tariffs and Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility as independent
variables. Standards errors are clustered at country of origin and country of destination. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis: *** Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at
1%.
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Table 6: Estimates of the IV (2SLS) regression
Dependent variable: Log Migrations
OLS IV
Log Exports 0.446*** 0.766**
(0.135) (0.318)
Log Distance -1.526*** -1.218***
(0.304) (0.366)
Log Bilateral Exchange Rates -0.154*** -0.118**
(0.0373) (0.0504)
Log GDP country of origin -0.388* -0.540
(0.204) (0.417)
Log GDP country of destination 1.369*** 1.422***
(0.468) (0.537)
Log Pop country of origin 0.869*** 0.880***
(0.162) (0.254)
Log Pop destination -0.688* -1.072***
(0.359) (0.356)
Year -0.0827*** -0.0690*
(0.0304) (0.0362)
Colony 0.410* 0.604**
(0.240) (0.277)
Constant 167.0*** 140.2**
(57.96) (68.63)
First stage F-statistic 19.251
Overidentification p-value 0.674
Hausman p-value 0.43
Observations 590 446
R-squared 0.605 0.599
Notes: The Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) approach uses Average trade tariffs and Bilateral
exchange rate volatility as instruments for trade flows.
30
Table 7: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Log Migrations
Poisson OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Exports 1.297*** 0.526*** 0.446*** 0.370*** 0.415***
(0.194) (0.145) (0.135) (0.116) (0.139)
Log Distance -0.677* -1.608*** -1.523*** -1.546*** -1.894***
(0.386) (0.303) (0.305) (0.303) (0.291)
Log Bilateral Exchange Rates -0.0356 -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.124*** -0.211***
(0.0753) (0.0371) (0.0374) (0.0394) (0.0469)
Log GDP country of origin (CoO) -0.701** 0.0122 -0.286
(0.305) (0.250) (0.216)
Log GDP country of destination 0.239 1.374*** 1.366*** 1.466*** 1.442***
(0.781) (0.447) (0.468) (0.454) (0.484)
Log Pop country of origin 0.745*** 0.878*** 0.623*** 0.615***
(0.175) (0.161) (0.111) (0.196)
Log Pop country of destination -0.281 -0.795** -0.687* -0.709** -0.708*
(0.770) (0.345) (0.359) (0.357) (0.375)
Log Sum of exports over each CoO -0.534***
(0.203)
Log (GDP country of origin-exports) -0.399*
(0.206)
Year -0.0849* -0.0726** -0.0819*** -0.105*** -0.0953***
(0.0510) (0.0292) (0.0304) (0.0263) (0.0311)
Colony 0.589 0.423* 0.403* 0.556** 0.605**
(0.605) (0.235) (0.238) (0.237) (0.241)
Constant 174.0* 149.2*** 165.4*** 209.9*** 195.4***
(98.93) (55.57) (57.90) (50.27) (58.82)
Observations 590 590 590 590 500
R-squared 0.613 0.606 0.602 0.623
Notes: We perform five different robustness checks. In the first one we run the regressions using a
Poisson estimator. The population in the country of origin measures the exposure. In the second
one we introduce as a regressor in the OLS the sum of all exports from a given Third
Mediterranean Countriy i to all European Union countries excluding country j, allowing for an
indirect effect on migrations towards the European country j. In the third one we use
GDP-exports of the country of origin instead of GDP. In the fourth one we don’t control for GDP
of the country of origin. In the fifth one we exclude Israel and Malta from the analysis.
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A Data sources
In our research we focus on those countries that took part to the Barcelona process
with just a couple of exceptions: the Palestinian Authority and Libya. Although the
former jointed the partnership, it has not been included in the analysis because the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), that collects data on national bilateral trade in
the “Direction of Trade Statistics” (DOTS), has no statistics on this country; as for
the latter it is included in our research both for its dramatic economic and political
importance in the region and because it belongs to the Union for the Mediterranean,
which is the institutional evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Because
of data limitations we use decennial data: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. Data on
national bilateral trade are expressed in US million dollars using the “Dyadic trade
data” (the Inter-University Consortium for the Political and Social Research).
Data on migrations, available every 10 years, are from “Global Bilateral Migra-
tion Database” (The World Bank) and are expressed in thousands of migrants.
Data on the bilateral distance, contiguity and language come from the “Geodist”
database (Centre d’e´tudes prospectives et d’informations inter-nationales) and are
in kilometers.
Data on Purchasing Power Parity converted GDP and on population are taken
from the “Penn World Table Version 7.0” (Center for International Comparisons of
Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania) and are expressed
in million dollars.
Data on trade tariffs, measured as tax revenue on customs and import duties
as percentage of GDP, are taken from the “Revenue Statistics - Comparative Series
dataset” (OECD). Since the database has many missing data for most of EU coun-
tries we take data from the closest (in time) available year. In particular we use,
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for all the countries, data of 1997 instead of those of the year 2000 and, just for
Ireland, data on the year 1971 instead of that of 1970. The empirical results are not
that different when we do not make these substitutions, but we prefer to make the
final analysis with a more complete dataset to make the results as much reliable as
possible. Data on total imports are taken from “World Trade Flows: 1962-2000 -
NBER-United Nations Trade Data, 1962-2000” (Feenstra et al., 2005). Finally, data
on the exchange rates are from the “Exchange rates crossrates, annual, 1970-2012”
(UNCTAD).
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Figure 4: Countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
Notes: We focus on these countries, but we include Libya and we exclude the Palestinian
Authority.
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Figure 5: Population trends in the EU countries in 1970-2010.
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Figure 6: Population and migration trends in the Third Mediterranean
countries in 1970-2000, normalized to be equal to 1 in 1970.
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